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A Philosophical Journey through Miracles, the Metaphysics, and 
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David Bayless, Samford University
(Editor's note: David Bayless' paper was selected for publication in the 2013 Agora because it 
was one of the best three presented at the ACTC Student Conference at Shimer College in 
Chicago in March 2013.)
Academic interests were almost completely nonexistent to me during my childhood. I 
did, however, develop a strong affinity for science. Science was more enjoyable to me than 
history, literature, and the other humanities because the performance of simple scientific 
experiments does not require the type of critical thinking that I used to loathe. After learning a 
scientific concept, I would simply walk outside or into my kitchen to personally confirm the 
basic theory I just learned. My sentiments were static for many years; science was tangible and 
exciting while the humanities were dull and esoteric. Nevertheless, my noetic pursuits were 
oriented toward philosophy soon after I picked up a copy of C.S. Lewis' Miracles during my 
senior year of high school. Although at the age of seventeen I was still largely indifferent to 
intellectual pursuits, I was mature enough to venture into unfamiliar academic territory. Lewis' 
argument against the rationality of metaphysical naturalism presented in chapter three of 
Miracles work captivated me.1 How, asks Lewis, can our ability to rationally construct scientific 
or philosophical theories arise from any combination of non-rational entities, such as atoms?
1 Lewis defines "metaphysical naturalism" as the belief that there is nothing beyond the "total system" of physical 
objects and processes (See Miracles in The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, 214). So defined, the naturalist 
may happily acknowledge the existence of potentially emergent phenomena (such as consciousness) as long as 
such emergent properties do not exist beyond the reach of physical description. It is notoriously difficult to define 
"physicality," but that need not concern us here.
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After researching and analyzing this "Argument from Reason," I was convinced that the 
existence of scientific reasoning was, surprisingly enough, evidence for the supernatural. My 
nascent intellectual curiosity was further awakened when I read Aristotle's Metaphysics and 
excerpts of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles within a few months of encountering 
Miracles. Aristotle and Aquinas' "Argument from Motion" hit me with an intellectual spell 
much akin to the one placed upon me by Miracles. The two classical thinkers are not merely 
arguing for supernaturalism; they trace the causal chain of motion in the physical world all the 
way back to a transcendent, Unmoved Mover. As I studied Aquinas and Aristotle, I noticed that 
Lewis utilizes a metaphysical cause-effect theory similar to the one that underpins the more 
traditional Argument from Motion to develop his own Argument from Reason. After months of 
research and discussion, I was led to believe that an examination of the rational inferences 
involved in science could end with a powerful argument for the existence of a nonphysical 
deity. A succinct presentation of the Arguments from Motion and Reason will allow me to draw
out the implications of the arguments' conclusions while tracing my journey from irreligious
2science-enthusiast to theistic student of science and philosophy.
My first encounter with the Argument from Reason occurred in the opening chapters of 
Miracles.3 Philosopher Victor Reppert's syllogistic presentation of Lewis' original argument 
runs as follows:
2 I will not present comprehensive apologies of the Arguments from Reason and Motion in such a brief paper. 
Victor Reppert's C.S. Lewis' Dangerous Idea, the "Argument from Reason" chapter in The Blackwell Companion to 
Natural Theology, and Michael Rea's World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism contain 
the strongest presentations of the Argument from Reason. See Ed Feser's Aquinas and Rudi te Velde's Aquinas on 
God for compelling defenses of Aquinas' First Way (i.e., the Argument from Motion).
3 I am grateful to my mentor and former professor, Dr. Robert Sloan Lee, for introducing me to Lewis as well as to 
philosophy in general.
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(1) No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of non-rational 
causes.
(2) If materialism [i.e., metaphysical naturalism] is true, then all beliefs can be fully
explained in terms of non-rational causes.
(3) Therefore, if naturalism is true, then no belief is rationally inferred.
(4) If any thesis entails the conclusion that no belief is rationally inferred, then it should
be rejected and its denial accepted.
(5) Therefore, materialism should be rejected and its denial accepted.4 
Let us briefly examine the argument's premises.
Being rather plausible, premises (2) and (4) require minimal comment. Premise (2) 
follows from the definition of "metaphysical naturalism," since physical objects and processes 
do not act for deliberate reasons. Premise (4) is derived from our intuitive and practical need 
for reasoning capabilities. Indeed, the resolute skeptic who denies premise (4) for arbitrary (as 
opposed to rational) reasons is implicitly throwing science, philosophy, history, or anything that 
requires reasoning out the window. Such a person gives every appearance of being beyond the 
reach of rational persuasion. The claim in (3) follows from (1) and (2), while the conclusion, 
which states that supernaturalism is true, is entailed by (3) and (4). The crucial premise is (1). 
Lewis' justification for premise (1) hinges on his distinction between two types of relationships: 
"Cause and Effect" relations and "Ground and Consequent" relations. 5 Cause-effect 
relationships describe physical processes. Consider our sense of touch. The cause of the 
physiological aspect of our perception is a proximate object compressing the
4 C.S. Lewis' Dangerous Idea, 57-8.
5 Miracles in The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, 219.
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mechanoreceptors within our skin and the effect is an electrochemical signal extending into our 
central nervous system.6 Ground-consequent relationships, on the other hand, encompass 
"logical relation[s] between beliefs or assertions."7 When we study a logically valid argument, 
for example, we can see that the premises establish the putative truth of the conclusion. The 
key distinction between the two relationships is that one is capable of countenancing our 
rational thought processes, while the other does not have the conceptual resources to do so. 
The cause-effect relationship cannot explain reasoning processes because the initial steps in 
any form of reasoning do not cause us to think about the next logical step; rather, they can 
serve only as a basis for doing so. When a scientist posits a simple, coherent, explanatorily 
powerful, and empirically adequate scientific theory to account for a specific corpus of data, the 
data does not blindly force the scientist to create a certain theory. Nevertheless,, as Lewis 
contends, if the reasoning process of the scientist were governed by the cause-effect 
relationship exemplified in all wholly physical events, then we should expect that the starting 
point of the process, namely, the data, would necessitate the formulation of a particular theory. 
However, this proposition is absurd; it is extremely implausible that numbers on a page literally 
cause scientists to propose a particular theory to account for that data as opposed to some 
other theory (or none at all). Moreover, scientists sometimes disagree on the theoretical 
explanations for a specified body of data.8 Put simply, premise (1) states that there is a
6 Neuroscience for Dummies, 69; Biology: Fourth Edition, 1028.
7 Miracles in The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, 219.
8 For example, there are four primary physical interpretations of quantum mechanics. Scientists generally agree on 
the mathematical equations governing the quantum world, but the physical meaning of the math is still debated. 
The four primary interpretations are hidden variables (DeBroglie-Bohm), no hidden variables (Copenhagen), choice 
has no consequences (Everett Many Worlds), and choice is nonexistent (Superdeterminism). Thus, the data does 
not entail a specific scientific interpretation. See James Sinclair, "At Home in the Multiverse?" in Contending with 
Christianity's Critics, p. 16.
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conceptual bridge between the non-rational, physical world and the rational, mental world. 
Lewis submits that the naturalist cannot cross such a bridge with any amount of 
neurophysiology or causal gymnastics.9
Since I was familiar with the ins and outs of scientific inquiry when I first read Miracles, 
Lewis' allusion to scientific reasoning within his development of the Argument from Reason 
captured my attention. For probably the first time in my life, I was fascinated by an argument 
that had little direct relevance to scientific study.10 Lewis' argument seemed (and still seems) 
simple, elegant, and powerful. I was unaware of it at the time, but Miracles had made the first 
chink in my armor of intellectual indifference. Soon after my introduction to philosophy, I was 
encouraged to research the strength and history of the Argument from Reason.11 I learned that 
the Argument from Reason has a rich history. The character of Socrates, in Plato's Phaedo, tells 
his friends that calling the "bones and sinews" of his body the causes of his remaining in prison 
"is too absurd." Rather, Socrates suggests, it is his decision to remain in prison that compels 
him to do so. Socrates' commonsense explanation is significant because the character
13incidentally separates the non-rational, physical realm from the rational, mental realm. 
Immanuel Kant makes a similar distinction when he differentiates human agents "being caused
9 The naturalist might object that the mental realm "supervenes" upon the physical realm within the brain. Such an 
ad hoc postulation can lead to problems for the naturalist further down the road. Why would brain matter without 
divine intervention possess the bizarre capability to generate a rational, perceiving agent? Moreover, how exactly 
can a group of atoms and molecules produce private, subjective sensations? For a discussion of the naturalistic 
supervenience theory, see A.D. Smith's "Non-Reductive Physicalism?" in Objections to Physicalism (1993) and J.B. 
Stump's "Non-reductive Materialism: A Dissenting Voice" in Christian Scholars Review 36 (2006).
10 The only relevance the Argument from Reason could have to science pertains to the limitations of neuroscience 
in explaining the functioning of reason in the human mind. However, this view represents more of a metaphysical 
boundary for neuroscience than a hard fact about the processes of the human brain.
11 I am, once again, grateful to Dr. Robert Sloan Lee for sending me on this historical quest.
13 Phaedo, 98a-99b.
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to act" from "having a reason to act."14 There is no doubt that Lewis, who was a very 
scrupulous and well-read scholar, was familiar with these authors and borrowed from their 
insights (along with Arthur Balfour's Theism and Humanism). Multiple variations of Lewis' 
original argument now exist: arguments from intentionality, truth, and mental causation are 
just a few. The influx of arguments against naturalism has obviously spawned many objections 
from naturalistic philosophers, but I remain convinced that all forms of Lewis' Argument from 
Reason are sound.15 Lewis' argument certainly burst my self-imposed scientific bubble and 
helped escort me into the world of philosophy, but I was merely open to a supernatural 
ontology and not really committed to one. Something more than an argument against 
naturalism was needed to finalize my intellectual journey.16
In the months following my brief exposure to the warming light of philosophy, I half- 
heartedly dabbled in the works of modern and ancient thinkers alike. At the behest of my 
mentors, I picked up the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle. Like most high school 
students who have been introduced to a liberal arts education, I had read excerpts of these 
thinkers' works and possessed a nominal understanding of their beliefs. I had even 
encountered Aquinas' First Way (i.e., Aristotle's Argument from Motion) in a philosophy class, 
but, unfortunately, in high school I lacked the initiative to carefully consider the merits of the 
argument or to venture beyond a lukewarm understanding of the metaphysical system that
14 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ch.3.
15 Well-known objectors include naturalistic philosophers Keith Parsons, Richard Carrier, Daniel Dennett, and 
Theodore Drange. Discussions of the Argument from Reason may be found in past issues of philosophy journals 
Philo (2.1, 1999; 3.1, 2000) and Philosophia Christi (3.2, 2001; 5.1, 2003).
16 The Argument from Reason raises the probability of the theistic hypothesis insofar as it rules out the viability of 
philosophical naturalism; however, with the exception of Presuppositionalists, like Cornelius Van Til and Greg 
Bahnsen, neither Lewis nor the modern proponents of the Argument from Reason formally trace human reason to 
the Judeo-Christian God within their actual arguments.
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undergirds the argument. Grasping the strength of Aristotle's Argument from Motion was 
possible only after reading through the Metaphysics and using supplemental works to develop a 
functional knowledge of Aristotelian metaphysics.17 During this period of time, I also learned 
that "Aristotle's view of nature, including his ideas about ends in nature, had become part of a 
large theological system" through the work of the medieval Christian and Muslim Scholastics.18 
At the forefront of the Scholastic movement is, of course, Thomas Aquinas, and the opening 
pages of Aquinas' most famous theological tracts, the Summa Theologica and the Summa 
Contra Gentiles, contain Aristotle's Argument from Motion.19
Aquinas' First Way was the key that finally opened my mind to the pursuit of 
philosophy. I found each of the Five Ways interesting, but the First Way was especially 
intriguing since it tapped into my love of science. Science is, after all, the study of motion in the 
forms of locomotion and alteration.20 What better way to lead a scientist to theism than by 
presenting him/her with an argument that begins with an empirical fact and ends with the 
existence of God?21 The First Way begins by stating that we observe motion. Motion is the 
"reduction of something from potentiality to actuality," and only something that is actualized
17 See The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (editor Jonathan Barnes; 1995), Eleonore Stump's Aquinas (2003), 
and Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives (editor Brian Davies; 2002) for explanations of 
Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysics.
18 Ancient Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction, 91.
19 Aquinas bluntly admits that he is appropriating Aristotle's work: we "shall first set forth the arguments by which 
Aristotle proceeds to prove that God exists" (Summa Contra Gentiles, I.13.2).
20 Aristotle writes in Physics III.1 that the four types of motion are locomotion (walking), alteration of substance 
(chemical reactions), alteration of quantity (filling a half-empty glass with water), and alteration of quality (change 
in color).
21 More than just an empirical observation is obviously needed. Philosopher Peter Kreeft writes that the Five Ways 
use three types of premises: an "implicit logical principle" (like the Law of Excluded Middle), an "explicit empirical 
datum" (like motion), and a "metaphysical principle" (like the impossibility of a causal infinite regress). See A 
Shorter Summa p.55.
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can effect such a reduction.22 Therefore, "nothing is moved at random, but there must always 
be something present to move it."23 Therefore, the causal chain of movement either goes to 
infinity or ends with an unmoved mover. However, the causal chain cannot go to infinity 
because every member of the series has "no causal power on [its] own" and must resultantly 
derive its causal power from a first cause, namely, the Unmoved Mover.24 Without a first cause 
that is pure actuality, the whole causal chain of motion is impossible. Note that the First Way 
does not establish the existence of the God of Classical Theism; the Unmoved Mover is a single, 
wholly actual, incredibly powerful, transcendent, and eternal being.25 The Argument from 
Reason, then, compelled me to reject naturalism, while the Argument from Motion filled the 
resultant conceptual void in my mind by establishing the existence of a powerful deity.
I have not presented a case for Christian theism. Moreover, there are doubtlessly many 
objections to the two renowned arguments I have discussed.26 I am comfortable with both of 
these facts. The purpose of this brief paper is not to stringently defend the Arguments from 
Reason and Motion, but to explain how a few months of reading, research, and discussion 
resulted in an exciting and permanent change in my intellectual life. The most exciting portion 
of my journey from intellectual insouciance to engaged philosophical inquiry was, for me, not 
my conversion from spiritual indifference to theism, nor was it the newfound -  and still strong -  
love of philosophy that I acquired. Rather, it was the joy of finding intellectual continuity 
between different authors from different traditions and time periods, for Lewis uses a close
22 Aquinas, 65.
23 Metaphysics, XII.6.33.
24 Aquinas, 71.
25 Aquinas believed that the Five Ways considered together could establish the existence of the Judeo-Christian 
God. Aquinas holds that, through observation and reason, we may deduce God's attributes because we are 
justified in deriving "causes from their effects" (Summa Contra Gentiles I.12.).
26The replies to these objections are often ignored rather than answered.
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variant of the metaphysical cause-effect theory employed by Aquinas and Aristotle in the 
Argument from Motion in his own Argument from Reason. Aquinas and Aristotle evoke a 
cause-effect theory of physical phenomena to prove that all present motion is directly enacted 
by a completely actualized Unmoved Mover; Lewis utilizes an approximation of this theory to 
show that philosophical naturalism is an inadequate conception of reality. The similarity of 
thought shared by these intellectuals is not ipso facto surprising since Aquinas had obviously 
read Aristotle and Lewis surely read both Aquinas and Aristotle. That these writers use 
equivalent ideas for different purposes is what really draws my attention. Such differences 
beckon us to inquiry regarding their understanding and deployment of the particular cause- 
effect theory of physical reality under consideration. Does Lewis use the cause-effect theory in 
a manner that is compatible with the Thomistic-Aristotelian use? What inspired Lewis to 
remove any mention of "potency" or "actuality" in his Argument from Reason? I enjoy poring 
over such questions when my head is clear of everyday thoughts. Aristotle opens his 
Metaphysics by opining that "all men by nature desire to know." I cannot say whether this 
claim is true, but I can say that Lewis, Aristotle, and Aquinas have helped me join the ranks of 
those who truly "desire to know."
27 Metaphysics, 1.1.
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